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CHISOM v. ROEMER:
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
by Randolph M. Scott-McLaughlin'

In an era increasingly marked by the Supreme Court's
willingness to restrict the scope of civil rights statutes and
precedents1, on June 20, 1991, the Court surprised its critics by
extending the ambit of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.' In Chisom v.
Roemers and Houston Lawyers' Association v. Attorney General of
Terns4 the Court held, by 6-3 majorities6, that section 2' of the

*

Associate Professor of Law. Pace University. B.A.,Columbia University (1975);
J.D., Haward University (1978). Chief Counsel to plaintiffs in France v. Cuomo, 92 Civ.
No. 1144 (JES) (S.D.N.Y.), challenging, under the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. $1973,
the at-large election of New York State's supreme court justices.
I wish to thank Adjunct Professor Elfrida A. Scott-McLaughlin, my colleague
and wife, for her constant support, review and critique of the final draft. Additionally,
I thank my research assistants, Dan Cherner and William DeVito, for their diligent
work.
1. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 60 U.S.L.W. 4135 (1992)(Court
adopted restrictive interpretation of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 1973, permitting
county commissioners to limit scope of individual commissioner's authority aher election
of African-American commissioner.); Patterson v. McClean, 491 U.S. 164 (1989) (Court
decided that 42 U.S.C. Q 1981 did not cover racial harassment.); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 755 (1989) (Court permitted post-judgment challenge to court-ordered affirmative
action plan by white employees who had notice of employment discrimination suit and
declined to intervene.); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (Court
increased plaintiffs burden of proof in Title VII, 42 U.S.C. $ 2000-e-2(a),cases.). See also
A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall, 105 Harv. L. Rev.
55,65 n.55 (1991) (There appears to be a deliberate retrenchment by a majority of the
current Supreme Court on many basic issues of human rights that Thurgood Marshall
advocated and that the Warren and Burger Courts vindicated.*)
2. 42 U.S.C. 5 1973 et seq.
3.
111S. Ct. 2354 (1991).
4.
111S. Ct. 2376 (1991).
5. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion in Chisom in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. 111 S. Ct. a t 2369. Justice Kennedy also filed
a separate dissent. Id. a t 2376. Similarly, in Houston Lawyers' Justice Scalia dissented,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy. 111S. Ct. a t 2382.
6. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, as amended in 1982, provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in
a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen
of the United States to vote on account of race or color, or in contravention of
the guarantees set forth in section 4(!X2), as provided in subsection (b).
(b) A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality
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Voting Rights Act applied to the election of state court judges. In
Chisom the court was presented with the issue of Congressional intent
as to the scope of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act when the statute
was amended in 1982. It was undisputed that section 2 as originally
enacted covered the election of state judges.' The narrow question was
whether Congress intended by the use of the word "representativen in
the amended section 2' to exclude state court judges from the statute's
coverage.' The Court concluded that Congress' use of the word
"representatives" in the statute was not intended to limit the scope of
section 2 to the executive and legislative branches of government.1°
Having determined in Chisom that section 2 applied to the election of
state court appellate judges, the Court had little difficulty in extending
the holding in Houston Lawyers' Association to include trial court
judges.
In Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Association, the Court
declined to address two substantive issues critical for pending and
future litigation" challenging the at-large election of state judges.I2

of circumstances, i t is shown that the political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State o r political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) in that ita members have less opportunity
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to
which members of a protected class have been elected to ofice in the
State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, that nothing in this section establishes a right
to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to
their proportion in the population.
42 U.S.C. 8 1973 (1982).
7. Chisom, 111S. Ct. a t 2362. Accord 111S. Ct. a t 2369 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I
agree with the Court that the original legislation . . . applied to all elections.")
8. Section 2(b) provides that a violation is established if minorities have less
opportunity than other members of the electorate to "participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their choice." 42 U.S.C. $1973(b) (emphasis supplied).
9. Traditionally, judges are not considered representatives. See Wells v. Edwards.
347 F. Supp. 453, summarily afd, 409 U.S. 1095 (1973) (District court concluded that
the concept of one person, one vote did not apply to judicial elections since judges were
not representatives.)
10. 111S. Ct. a t 2366-67.
11 Such suits are pending in New York. Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, North
Carolina. Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, and Louisiana. See Judge Suits Thrive, Natl L. J.,
.Mar. 9. 1992. a t 6.

Heinonline - - 24 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 2 1992-1993

.

1992-931

VOTING RIGHTS ACT

3

The Court expressly stated that it would not decide the elements that
must be proved to establish a violation of section 2 or the remedy that
would bi appropriate for a violation proven in the context of a judicial
election."
Part I1 will discuss the Chisom and Houston Lawyers'
Association decisions. Analysis of these decisions, combined with a
review of the legislative history, supports the Court's view of the
amended section 2. In fact, there was no direct or indirect suggestion
at any point in the extensive legislative history that Congress intended
to exclude judicial elections from the coverage of section 2.Part I11 will
address the liability issue left unanswered by the court. To determine
whether the at-large election of judges violates section 2, the courts
should apply the standards developed in Thornburg v. Gingles.14 The
Gingles Court concluded that three threshold questions were critical
to a challenge of an at-large election system. In order to prevail in a
vote dilution15 case, plaintiffs were required to demonstrate that the
minority population was geographically concentrated, politically
cohesive, and that racial bloc voting existed in the jurisdiction.16

12. In an at-large election, a candidate must achieve a plurality or majority of
votes from all the citizens of a county or city who are entitled to vote in an election. In
jurisdictions where African-Americans, Hispanics, or Asians constitute a minority of the
voters, white voters can use racial bloc voting tendencies to defeat minority candidates.
An alternative to the at-large election is a district or ward system. In a district election,
a candidate must achieve a majority or plurality of votes from the citizens residing in his
or her district. Where minority groups are geographically concentrated, districts can be
created that afford members of those groups a fair opportunity to nominate and elect
candidates of their choice as required by section 2. See, e.g., Paul W. Bonapfel, Minority
Challenges to At-Large Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 353 (1976);
Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group
Representation: A Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in Minority
Vote Dilution 65 (Chandler Davidson, paperback ed. 1984).
13. Chisom, 111S. Ct. a t 2361.
14. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
15. Dilution of a minority group's voting strength may be caused by the dispersal
of the group into districts in which they constitute a minority of voters or from
overconcentration of members of the group into districts where they constitute an
excessive majority. The former condition is called ucracking" and the latter is termed
"packing". See, e.g., Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26
Vand. L. Rev. 523 (1973); Frank Parker, Racially Geriymndering and Legislative
Reapportionment, in Minority Vote Dilution 86 (Chandler Davidson, paperback ed. 1984).
16. 478 U.S. a t 50. The reason for requiring these three factors as prima facie
elements of proof is that unless a minority group is sufficiently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single district, the group can not contend that the
at-large system has prevented them from electing candidates of their choice. Unless the
minority voters would have the potential to nominate or elect candidates of their choice
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Additionally, the courts should utilize the factors identified in the
Senate Judiciary Committee's report that accompanied the
amendments to section 2."
In Part IV, alternatives to at-large election systems will be
examined to determine the appropriate remedy where a state's judicial
election system violates section 2. Traditionally, the courts have
remedied at-large election violations by creating smaller subdistricts
where minority group members constitute a majority of the district."
The article concludes that the courts should review at-large judicial
systems utilizing the same criteria that have been developed in vote
in the absence of the challenged at-large system, they can not claim that their rights
have been violated by that practice. Similarly, in the absence of racial bloc voting
patterns, an at-large election system would not enable a white majority, by voting as a
bloc, to defeat minority candidates.
17. The Senate Report noted that the following factors might be probative of a
section 2 violation:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, antisingle shot pr&sions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group;
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas
as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process;
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
S. Rep. No. 417,97th Cong., 2nd Sess., a t 28-29 (19821, (footnotes omitted) reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177 [hereinafter S. Rep.]. The Court in Gingles stated that the Senate
Report was the authoritative guide to the meaning of the amended section 2. 478 U.S.
a t 43 n.7.
18. See, eg., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Citizens For A Better
Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398,
(7th Cir. 19841, cert. denied, 471 U.S 1135 (1984); Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297
(5th Cir. 1973). affd per curium sub nom., East Carroll Parish School District v.
Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976).
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dilution challenges to other at-large election systems. Similarly, the
remedial measures that have been employed to correct violations of
section 2 in challenges to other at-large election systems should be
equally applicable in the judicial context.

A.

Chisom v. Roemer

In Chisom, African-American voters challenged the method for
electingjustices of the Louisiana Supreme Court from the New Orleans
area. The Louisiana Supreme Court contained seven justices, two of
whom were elected from the first supreme court district, consisting of
the parishes of Orleans, St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson.
African-Americans constituted more than one-half of the registered
voters in Orleans parish whereas more than three-fourths of the
registered voters in the other three parishes in the first supreme court
district were white. Therefore, the plaintiffs contended that the
submergence of the predominantly African-Americanvoters of Orleans
parish into the majority white parishes of St. Bernard, Plaquemines,
and Jefferson weakened their voting strength in violation of section
2.19

Chisom v. Edwards, 659 F. Supp. 183, 184 (E.D.La. 1987). As a remedy for
19.
the perceived violation, plaintiffs argued that each of the seven justices of the Louisiana
supreme court should be elected from separate judicial districts. With respect to the first
supreme court judicial district, the plaintiffs proposed that it be subdivided into two
separate subdistricts. One subdistrict would contain Orleans parish. The other
subdistrict would consist of St. Bernard, Plaquemines, and Jefferson parishes. Chisom.
Under plaintiffs' proposal each of the seven justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court
would be elected from a separate district. By subdividing the first supreme court district
into a majority African-American and majority white districts, African-American voters
would have an opportunity to nominate and elect one supreme court justice from Orleans
parish.
The district court dismissed the complaint and determined that judicial
elections were not covered by section 2. Chisom a t 187. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion regarding the applicability of
section 2 to judicial elections. 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988). The circuit court held that
Congress' use of the term %epresentativewin the 1982 amendments to section 2 was not
intended to remove judicial elections from the coverage of the statute. Id. a t 1063. The
court interpreted the term %presentativen as denoting an office holder selected by
popular election from among a field of candidates. Id.
On iemand, the district court concluded that plaintiffs had failed to establish
a violation of section 2 under the standards articulated in Gingles. Chisom v. Roemer,
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The sole question before the Court was whether Congress,
when it amended section 2 in 1982, intended to remove judicial
elections from the statute's scope.20 The Court noted that i t was
undisputed that section 2 as originally enacted applied to judicial
election^.^^ In light of the plain meaning of the original section 2, its
purpose and legislative history, the Court determined that as enacted
in 1965, section 2 applied to all election^.^
Having determined that all elections, including judicial
elections came within the purview of the original provisions of section
2, the .Court turned to the central issue: whether Congress, in
amending section 2, used the term "representative" to limit the scope
of the statute.23The Court stated that the term "representative" was

Civ. Act. No. 86-4057.1989
106485 (E.D. La. 1989). While plaintiffs' appeal of the
district court's opinion was pending, the fiRh circuit, sitting en bane,in League of United
Latin American Citizens Council No. 4234 u. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990).
rejected the earlier panel decision in Chisom and concluded that Congress's use of the
term "representative" in section 2 waa intended to exclude judicial elections from the
statute's protections. Following the LULAC decision, the fZth circuit remanded Chisom
and directed the district court to dismiss the complaint. Chisom v. Roemer, 917 F.2d 187
(5th Cir. 1990). The Supreme Court granted plaintiffs' petition for a writ of certiorari.
Chisom v. Roemer, 111S. Ct. 775 (1991).
111 S. Ct. a t 2361. The Court expressly reserved judgment concerning the
20.
elements that must be proved in order to establish a section 2 violation when at-large
judicial elections are challenged or the appropriate remedy for such a violation. Id.
21. Id. a t 2361. The text of section 2 as originally enacted provided:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard,
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or
political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any citizen of the
United States to vote on account of color.
Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. 8 1973 (1964 ed. Supp. I.). The term "vote" or
%oting" was defined as "all action necessary to make a vote effective in any primary,
special. or general election." Q14(c)of the Voting Rights Act of 1965,79 Stat. 445 (1965).
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, in testimony before the House of Representatives
regarding the scope of the original section 2, testified that "every election in which
registered voters are permitted to vote would be covered" under section 2. Hearings on
H.R. 6400 and Other Proposals to Enforce the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong.. 1st Sess., 21 (1965).
22.
111S. Ct. a t 2362 ("Section 2 protected the right to vote, and it did so without
making any distinctions or imposing any limitations as to which elections would fall
within its purview.").
23.
Section 2(b) provides that a violation of subsection (a) is established if it is
shown that racial and language minorities %ave less opportunity than other members
of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their
choice." This phrase was patterned after language used in White u. Regester, 412 U.S.
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broader than "legislator" and rejected the contention that Congress, by
adopting the former, intended to remove judges from the scope of
section 2. In the Court's opinion, the change from legislator to
representative implied that Congress intended the statute to apply to
members of the judiciary as well as the legislative branch.% The
Court believed that the term "representative" was intended to include
the winners of popular elections, not just legislative contests.% The
Court reasoned that if members of the executive branch of government
could be considered "representativesn by virtue of having been selected
by popular election, then the same could be said of elected judges.2s
Additionally, the Court considered judges policymakers who brought
to the bench a consideration of what was in the best interest of the
~ommunity.~'
Based on the relationship between the elected judges,
the voters, and the role that judges play in American society, the Court
decided that elected judges were representatives within the meaning
of section 2's use of that term.
The Court, in rejecting the argument that Congress intended
to restrict the coverage of section 2, observed that such an intent would
have been made explicit in the statute. At the very least, the
legislative history would have mentioned that the use of the term
"representative" was intended to restrict the categories of elections that
came within the purview of the amended section 2.= Congress' silence

.

755,766 (1973) (The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence . . that its members had
less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political
process and to elect legislators of their choice.") and Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S.124,
149 (1971) (Plaintiffs had to show that they "had less opportunity than did other . . .
residents to participate in the political process and to elect legislators of their choice.")
See S. Rep. a t 27 (Section 2(b) was intended to "embodLy] the test laid down by the
Supreme Court in White.").
24.
111S.Ct. a t 2366.
25. The Court observed that:
If executive officers, such as prosecutors, sheriffs, state attorneys
general, and state treasurers, can be considered %epresentatives"
simply because they are chosen by popular election, then the same
reasoning should apply to elected judges.
111 S. Ct. a t 2366.
26.
111 S. Ct. a t 2366.
27. Id. a t 2366 n.27.
28. Id. a t 2364. The Court likened the absence in the legislative history of any
reference to the limiting effect of the term "representative* to the dog that did not bark.
Id. a t 2364 n.23. In reaching the conclusion that some member of Congress would have
noted such a radical change if the amendments were designed to exclude judicial
elections, the Court quoted Harrison v. PPB Industries, 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissentingxln a case where the construction of legislative language . .
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in this regard was interpreted by the Court to mean that the statute's
scope was coextensive with the original section 2." The Court
expressed its belief that Congress, which had made an express effort
to broaden the protections afforded by the Voting Rights Act3' would
not, without comment, withdraw an important category of elections
from that p r ~ t e c t i o n . ~ ~
The Court also rejected the contention that since judicial
elections were not governed by the fourteenth amendment's "oneperson, one-vote standards", first articulated in Gray v. Sanders,32
such elections should be immune from vote dilution claims under
section 2.33 The flaw in this argument is that one-person, one-vote
claims and vote dilution claims address two completely different issues.
In order to prevail under the one-person, one-vote standard, a plaintiff

. makes so sweeping and so relatively unorthodox a change . . . I think judges as well as
detectives may take into consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the
night."). See also American Hosp. Assn. v. NLRB, 111S. Ct. 1539, 1543-44 (1991).
29.
111 S. Ct. a t 2368.
30. The conclusion that Congress intended to broaden the protections of the Act
is supported by the legislative history of the 1982 amendments. In amending the statute,
Congress sought to eradicate the Court's limiting decision in Mobik v. Bolden, 446 U.S.
55 (1980). In Mobik, the Court determined that in order to establish a violation of the
fifteenth amendment and section 2, a voting rights plaintiff had to prove that the
challenged practice or procedure had been adopted or was being maintained in order to
discriminate intentionally against racial minorities. Id. a t 60-61. The Chisom Court
stated that Congress in 1982 eliminated the intent requirement of section 2 and replaced
it with a results test. Under the new test, a plaintiff could prevail by demonstrating that
a challenged election practice resulted in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote
on account of race or color.
In reaching its conclusion regarding the intent of Congress in amending the
Voting Rights Act in 1982, the Court relied on the report of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary that accompanied the amended section 2. 111S. Ct. a t 2363 n.20. The Senate
Report stated that:
This amendment is designed to make clear that proof of
discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of
Section 2. It thereby restores the legal standards . . . which applied
in voting discrimination claims prior to the litigation involved in
Mobik v. Bolden.
S. Rep. a t 2 (footnotes omitted).
31. Chisom, 111S. Ct. a t 2368.
32. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
33. The Court in a per curiam opinion had upheld a district court's decision that
judicial elections were not subject to the one-person, one-vote standard. Wells v.
Edwards, 409 U.S. 1095 (19731, affg, 409 F. Supp 453 (M.D.
La. 1972).
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has to demonstrate the existence of a numerical imbalancesMwhereas
in a vote dilution claim the key issue is whether a practice or
procedure operates in a fashion to deny or abridge the right to vote to
racial or language minorities. In fact, a claim can pass muster under
the one-person, one-vote test and violate section 2's vote dilution
standard.35 The Court concluded that the inapplicability of the oneperson, one-vote rule to judicial elections did not insulate those
elections from vote dilution claims.
In light of the legislative history of the amendments, the
Court's interpretation of that section was consistent with Congress'
intent. According to the Senate Report,%the objective of Congress in
amending section 2 was, in part, to clarify the standards for proving
.a violation of that section3' by eliminating proof of discriminatory
intent as an element of a section 2 case and restoring the legal
Nothing in
standards that predated the restrictive Mobile de~ision.'~
the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to eliminate
judicial elections from the scope of the amended section 2?9 Given the
complete absence of any suggestion in the legislative history that the
revisions to section 2 were designed to restrict the scope of the original

34. The Court in Gmy held that under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment,
[olnce the geographical unit for which a representative is to be
chosen is designated, all who participate in the election are to have
an equal vote - whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever
their occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home
may be in that geographical unit.
372 U.S. a t 369. The rule has been interpreted to mean that 'each person's vote counts
a s much, insofar as it is practicable, as any other person's." Hadley v. Junior College
District, 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970).
35. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S 755 (1973) (Court reversed finding that
state reapportionment plan violated one-person, one-vote standard, but sustained finding
of racial vote dilution.); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,751 (1973) (Court held that
one-person, one-vote principle was inapplicable to a claim of racially based vote dilution.);
Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297, 1303 (5th Cir. 1973) (en banc) ('[Allthough
population is the proper measure of equality in apportionment . . . the Supreme Court
announced that access to the political process and not population was the barometer of
dilution of minority voting strength.").
36. The Court in Gingles, 478 U.S. a t 43 n.7, concluded that the Senate Report
should be considered as an authoritative source of the legislative intent behind the 1982
amendments.
37. S. Rep., supm note 17, a t 2.
38. Id. a t 179.
39. In fact, Senator O m n Hatch commented that the amended section 2 would
"encompas[s] all governmental units, including. . .judicial districts." Id. a t 151.
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statute by excluding judicial elections, the Court properly concluded
that no such radical change was intended.
A review of the Senate Report further reveals that the terms
"representative", "candidate" and "elected officials" were used
interchangeably, buttressing the conclusion that Congress did not
choose the term "representativen to have a limiting effect.40 The
Chisom Court read section 2(b) contextually and found that the use of
the term was not meant to limit the statute to elections for the
representative branch of government." This interpretation is
consistent with the Court's view that the Voting Rights Act should be
construed as having the broadest possible scope.42
The Chisom Court was also correct in rejecting the argument
that judicial elections were exempt from vote dilution claims because
of the exclusion of such elections from one-person one-vote challenges.
Because the two claims are premised on different questions, the
standard utilized to determine the validity of an apportionment plan
should not govern racial vote dilution cases. A malapportionment claim
is based on the fourteenth amendment and addresses issues of equality
.~
2 claims are based on the Voting Rights Act
of p o p ~ l a t i o n Section

40. See, e.g., S. Rep., supm note 17 a t 16 ("elected officialsa); id. a t 28 ('7f as a
result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity
to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice, there is
a violation of this section.') (emphasis added); id. a t 29 n.115 ("[Tlhe election of a few
minority candidates does not necessarily foreclose the possibility of dilution of the black
d a t 30 ("[Tlhe ultimate test would
vote in violation of this section.") (emphasis added); i
be the White standard codified by this amendment of Section 2: whether, in the
particular situation, the practice operated to deny the minority plaintiff an equal
opportunity to participate and to elect ca-8
of their choice.") (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added); id. a t 31 ("The court should exercise its traditional equitable powers
to fashion the relief so that it . . provides equal opportunity for minority citizens to
participate and elect candidates of their choice.") (footnote omitted) (emphasis added);
id. a t 32 ( m h e wurta looked to determine whether. . . the members of the minority
group had the same 'opportunity' as others in the electorate to 'participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their choice.") (emphasis added).
It is a well-settled axiom of statutory construction that Yhe meaning of a
41.
statute is to be looked for, not in any single section, but in all the parta together and in
their relation to the end in view." Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439
(1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
42. Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,566-567 (1966).
43. See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50.56 (1970) ("[Wlhen members
of an elected body are chosen from separate districts, each district must be established
on a basis that will insure, as far a s is practicable, that equal numbera of voters can vote
for proportionally equal numbers of oficials."); Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp 453,455
(1972).

.

Heinonline - - 2 4 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 0 1 9 9 2 - 1 9 9 3

1992-931

VOTING RIGHTS ACT

11

and are concerned with the racial composition of the election districts
not the equal apportionment of population in these electoral units.u
A redistricting scheme may violate section 2 if the change submerges
a geographically and politically cohesive minority population in a
majority white district, even though the challenged plans satisfies the
one-person, one-vote ~tandard.~'The determination that judicial
elections are not subject to a malapportionment challenge thus has no
relevance to the issue of whether those elections may be subject to a
claim that the election system denies minority voters a n equal
opportunity to participate in the electoral process.
The Chisom Court was correct in concluding that the scope of
section 2 remained unchanged. Both Congressional intent to lessen the
proof burdens of plaintiffs in voting rights cases and the complete
absence of any mention in the extensive legislative history that judicial
elections were to be excluded from the protections afforded under the
amended section 2 provide additional support for the Court's decision.
Further, the Court's refusal to rely on the one-person, one-vote
standard to limit the scope of section 2 in the judicial context
demonstrates that the Court was willing to give the section the
broadest possible interpretation.

Senator Hatch recognized this distinction and acknowledged that vote dilution
44.
and malapportionment claims.were separate and distinct. 128 Cong. Rec. 13,129 (1982)
(Senator Hatch stating that the one-person one-vote standard 'is an entirely different
concept than the one that has evolved under provisions of the Voting Righta Act..).
In White,the Supreme Court reversed the district court's conclusion that a
45.
state reapportionment plan violated one-person, one-vote standards, but sustained the
finding that the plan diluted minority voting strength. 412 U.S. a t 761-64, 765-70. See
also Gaffney v. Cumminga, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (One-person, one-vote standard
inapplicable to a claim of racially-based vote dilution.) Accord Voter Information Project
v. City of Baton Rouge, 612 F.2d 208 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Houston LawyersJAssociation v. Attorney General of Texasa

Houston LawyersJAssociation was a challenge to the at-large
election of trial court judges in ten counties in Texas.47The Court
granted certiorari for the limited purpose of deciding the legitimacy of
the fifth circuit's conclusion that the election of trial judges was not
subject to section 2 review.@As in Chisom, the Court concluded that
elections for state court trial judges were covered by section 2's
requirements. In reaching its conclusion, the Court put to rest the
notion that certain offices were exempt from section 2's review.49The
Court ruled that the Voting Rights Act encompassed the election of

111S. Ct. 2376 (1991). There were two organizational petitioners in Houston
46.
Lawyers' Association, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the
Houston Lawyers' Association. LULAC, a Texas statewide organization composed of
Mexican-Americans and African-American residents of Texas, had challenged the at-large
election system used by Texas in the election of district judges. The Fifth Circuit panel
held that the election of trial judges was not subject to section 2. LULAC v. Clements,
902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990). After granting rehearing en banc, the circuit court held
that all judicial elections were not subject to section 2. LULAC v. Clements, 914 F.2d.
620 (5th Cir. 1990). Houston Lawyers Association, an organization of African-American
attorneys, intervened in support of the original plaintiffs in LULAC and sought review
in the Supreme Court of the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision. 111S. Ct. a t 2378.
47.
Texas district courts are the trial courts of general jurisdiction and are elected
fmm judicial districts. Eight of the challenged judicial districts elected district judges
fmm a single county and two elected judges from a bi-county district. Each judicial
candidate was required to be a resident of the district in which helahe sought judicial
office. Candidates for district court sought election for a separately numbered seat or
post. The petitioners contended that the at-large, district wide election system diluted
the voting strength of African-American and Mexican-American voters due to the
submergence of these minority groups into a white majority population that was able
usually to defeat minority preferred candidates. 111S. Ct. a t 2378-79.
48.
111S. Ct. 775 (1991).
The panel in LULAC had decided that since Texas district court judges were
49.
'single-member office" holders, section 2 was inapplicable. 902 F.2d a t 308. The panel
relied on the second circuit's decision in Butts v. City of New York, 779 F. 2d 141 (2nd
Cir. 19851, cert denied, 478 U.S. 1021 (19861, distinguishing elections for multi-member
bodies from single member offices. The Butts court concluded that whereas in an election
to a multi-member body, a minority class has an opportunity to secure a share of
representation equal to that of other classes by electing its members fmm districts, there
could be no share of a single-member office, and, therefore, a section 2 vote dilution
challenge was inappropriate. 779 F. 2d a t 148. Similarly, the panel, in rejecting LULAC's
claim, stated that since The full authority of a trial judge's office is exercised exclusively
by one individual," a vote dilution challenge must fail because "there can be no share of
such a single-member office." 902 F.2d a t 308.
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executive officers and trial judges notwithstanding the fact that these
office holders act independently or that one person only holds the
office.* However, despite its decision that single-member office holders, including trial judges, were subject to the Voting Rights Act, the
Court concluded that a state's interest in the maintenance of an atlarge judicial election system was a legitimate factor to be weighed
under the totality of circumstances test of section 2.'l However, the
Court cautioned that the state's interest was merely one factor to be
considered and that interest would not in every case be sufficient to
outweigh proof of racial vote dil~tion.'~
The Court's rejection of the single-member theory in Houston
Lawyers' Association was justified as applied to the election of trial
court judges. Even if this theory had merit in other contexts, which the
Court questioned, the single-member exception was inappropriate as
applied to trial judges. The hallmark of a single-member office is that
there is only one office holder for an entire geographic region, therefore
the jurisdiction can not be subdivided without changing the form of
government to a multi-member body. In counties that hold at-large
elections for trial judges, numerous judges are elected from each
county or judicial district and several judges serve within the district.
Such is not the case where a single mayor is elected in a city. Thus,
the question becomes whether the judicial district can be subdivided
into smaller geographical units so that the votes of minority electors
are not submerged into a bloc of white votes. The Butts case, upon
which the panel relied in its decision, does not address that issue, and
the Court was correct in rejecting the application of the single-member
office theory to the election of multiple judges on an at-large basis.
Additionally, the Court's refusal to allow the state's interest in
maintaining at-large judicial elections to exclude those contests from
vote dilution challenges furthers the interests of the Act. Under the
Court's ruling, a state may argue that it has a compelling interest in
the maintenance of such a system, but such considerations will be
relevant a t the liability phase or the remedial phase of a vote dilution
litigation only and cannot be used to exclude judicial contests from
section 2's coverage.

50.
51.
52.

111 S. Ct. at 2380.
Id. at 2381.
Id. at 2381.
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Thornburg v. Gingless3

A.

Notwithstanding the Court's inclusion of state court judicial
elections in the coverage of section 2, the Court's failure to address
liability or remedial issues has created little guidance for the courts
and potential litigants. With respect to establishing liability, the Court
in Gingles set forth the criteria for a vote dilution case under the
amended section 2, and this standard should be applicable to judicial
elections.
In Gingles, the Court had the occasion to interpret the recently
amended Voting Rights Act and to establish the standard of proof
under section 2. The Court relied primarily on the Senate Report to aid
in the interpretive pro~ess.'~According to the Senate Report, the
primary question in a vote dilution challenge is whether, as a result of
the challenged voting practice or structure, minority group members
do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process
and to elect candidates of their choice.55 The Report lists certain
factors in an effort to provide guidance in the determination of this
issue.66In addition to these factors, the Report states that evidence

478 U.S. 30 (1986).
54. The Court noted that it had recognized repeatedly that the committee report.
on a bill were the authoritative source for legislative intent. 478 U.S. a t 43; Garcia v.
United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168 (1969).
55.
478 U.S. a t 44; See also S. Rep., supm note 17, a t 28.
56.
The Senate Report noted the probity of the following factors in a section 2
violation:
1. The extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or
political subdivision that touched the right of the members of the
minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the
democratic process;
2. The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political
subdivision is racially polarized;
3. The extent to which the state or political subdivision has used
unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, antisingle shot provisions, or other voting practices or procedures that
may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority
group;
4. If there is a candidate slating process, whether members of the
minority group have been denied access to that process;
5. The extent to which members of the minority group in the state or
53.
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concerning the degree to which elected officials are responsive to the
needs of members of minority groups may have probative value?' The
Report also indicates that the interest of the state in the maintenance
of the challenged structure is also relevant to the determination of a
vote dilution challenge.* The Gingles Court recognized that these factors were important to deciding a vote dilution challenge, but stressed
that the Report stated that the list of factors was neither
comprehensive nor e x c l u ~ i v e . ~In~ the Court's analysis, the
determination of the degree of minority access to the political process
should be made on the basis of a practical evaluation of the present
and past reality, combined with a functional view of the political pro~ess.~
After setting forth its o v e ~ e wof the determination of a
section 2 violation, as evidenced by the Senate Report, the Court
turned to an examination of the elements of a vote dilution challenge.
The Court stated that the essence of a section 2 claim was that a n
election law, practice or structure, in conjunction with social and
historical conditions, resulted in the diminution of the ability of
minority voters to elect their preferred candidates?' The Court in
prior decisions had recognized that at-large election schemes can
operate to deny minority group members equal access to the political
process." However, the Court cautioned that minority group members

political subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas
as education, employment and health, which hinder their ability to
participate effectively in the political process;
6. Whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or
subtle racial appeals;
7. The extent to which members of the minority group have been
elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
S. Rep., supra note 17, a t 28-29.
S. Rep., supm note 17, a t 29.
57.
58. Id. a t 29.
Gingles. 478 U.S. a t 45.
59.
60. Id. a t 45.
61. Id. a t 47.
62.
See Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S.
613,617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 a t 765 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403
U.S. 124,143 (1971). See also Barbara L. Berry & Thomas R. Dye, The Discriminatory
Effects of At-Large Elections. 7 Fla St. U. L. Rev. 85 (1979); James Blacksher & Larry
Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 34 Hastings L.J. 1(1982);
Paul W. Bonapfel, Minority Challenges to At-Lurge Elections: The Dilution Problem, 10
Ga. L. Rev 353 (1976); Katherine I.Butler. Constitutiod and Statutory Chulknges to
Election Structures: Dilution and the Value of the Right to Vote, 42 La. L. Rev. 851
(1982).
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who challenge such systems must prove that the use of the challenged
structure operates to minimize the ability of the group to elect their
preferred candidatesB3
In order to prevail on a claim that the use of a multimember
or at-large election system dilutes minority voting strength, the Court
stated that the following circumstances must be found by the district
court. The minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a singlemember distri~t.~"
Additionally, the minority group must be able to
show that it is politically cohesive.65Finally, the group must establish
that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to
. ~ demonstrating the existence of these
defeat minority ~ a n d i d a t e sBy
factors, the minority group can establish that submergence in a white
multimember district impedes its ability to elect its chosen
representatives.
The standard delineated in Gingles should be applicable to a
section 2 challenge to an at-large judicial election system. In order to
prevail, minority group plaintiffs must make a threshold showing that
its members are so geographically compact that single-member
districts could be created in which they constitute a numerical
majority. Additionally, if the minority group offers proof of minority
political cohesion and racially polarized voting patterns among white
voters they could establish that the conjunction of the submergence of
the minority group into the larger white district, and the at-large

63. Gingles, 478 U.S. a t 48.
64. Gingles, 478 U.S. a t 50. Unless the minority group has the potential to elect
representatives in the absence of the challenged structure, there can be no dilution. The
single-member district is the appropriate standard against which to measure the
potential of the minority group to elect candidates of its choice because it is the smallest
political unit from which representatives are elected. Id. a t 50 n.17. If the minority
group is dispersed throughout an at-large district or county or is so numerically small
that it could not constitute a mqjority in a single-member district, the group cannot
maintain that they can elect representatives of their choice in the absence of the
challenged structure because a smaller political subdistrict or unit could not be created
consistent with the Constitution's one-person one-vote standard.
65. Id. a t 51.
66. Id. a t 51. In the absence of significant white bloc voting, it can not be
contended that the ability of minority group members to elect their chosen
representatives was inferior to white voters or that the at-large structure impeded the
ability of minorities to win a t the polls. See, e.g.. McMillan v. Escambia County, Fla., 748
F.2d 1037,1043 (5th Cir. 1984); United States v. Marengo County Commission, 731 F.2d
1546,1566 (11th Cir. 19841, appeal dism'd and cert. denied, 469 U.S. 951 (1984); Nevitt
v. Sides, 571 F.2d 209, 223 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 951 (1980).
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nature of the election system, resulted in a diminution of the group's
ability to elect candidates of their choice.
Once this threshold showing is made, the court may explore the
evidence concerning the other factors discussed in Gingles and listed
in the Senate Report.e7 At this point, the state's interest in
maintaining the at-large system as it stands should be weighed. While
the Houston Lawyers'Associution Court did not provide guidance as to
how much weight the state's interests are allowed, in light of the
purpose of the Act to correct a pernicious history of discriminationw
in the exercise of the franchise, the state should be required to
demonstrate a compelling reason before such an interest outweighs
proof of the Gingles threshold factors. This approach has been
employed with varying results in cases involving challenges to the atlarge election of state court judges.69

B.

Clark u. Roemer7'

In Clark, plaintiffs claimed that the use of multimember
districts to elect family court, district court and court of appeals judges
diluted black voting strength in violation of section 2.'' Although the

See supm note 56 and accompanying text for a discussion of these factors.
67.
68. The Senate Report discussed the history of racial discrimination in the exercise
of the franchise as follows:
[Tlraditionally, black Americans were denied the franchise
throughout the South. After statutory bars to voting by blacks were
lifted, the main device was denial of voter registration -by violence,
by harassment, and by the use of literacy testa or other screening
methods.
S. Rep., supra note 17, a t 5.
69. Clark v. Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991)(District court found section
2 violations employing Gingles test and Senate Report factors); Southern Christian
Leadership Conference v. Evans, 785 F. Supp. 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (District court
rejected challenge to at-large judicial election system).
70. This case was originally filed against Governor Edwin W. Edwards. Charles
Roemer, Edwards' successor in office, was substituted as a defendant. Clark v. Edwards,
725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988).
71.
Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp a t 285. There were 178 district court judges in
Louisiana, 169 of whom were elected from multimember districts. Id. a t 289. In judicial
districts that elected more than one district court judge, the elections were held under
an at-large system consisting of the entire district (multimember districts). Id. a t 287-88.
Such districts ranged in size from 345 square miles to 2239 square miles. Id. a t 300. At
the time of the litigation, African-Americans held only five of the district court
judgeships. Id. a t 299.
There were five circuit courts of appeal, each of which was divided into
separate elections districts. There were 48 court of appeals judges in Louisiana, 44 of
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decision on liability was made prior to the Court's rulings in Chisom
and Houston Lawyers' Association, the district court utilized the
Gingles analysis and the Senate Report's factors in reaching its
conclusion that the at-large judicial system in Louisiana violated the
The district court analyzed the facts and found that numerous
Senate Report factors," connoting a possible violation, were evident.
There had been a long history of official discrimination in Louisiana
that touched on the right of African-American citizens to register, to
vote and to otherwise participate in the democratic process.74 In
finding the existence of racially polarized voting patterns in elections
in each of the family court, district court and court of appeals judicial
districts, the court relied on prior judicial findings7' on this issue and
the testimony of two experts.76The court concluded that there were

whom were elected from multimember districts. In those districts that contained more
than one judge, the judges were elected on an atlarge district basis. Id. a t 288. The court
of appeals districts ranged in size from 19.344 q u a r e miles to 350 square miles. Id. a t
300. The family court in East Baton Rouge Parish, the 6nly family court district
challenged by plaintiffs, was composed of three judges who were elected a t large from the
entire parish. African-Americans constituted 31.3% of the population of the parish. Id.
a t 288. One African-American had been elected to the court of appeals.
Candidates for district court, appellate court judgeships from multimember
districts and.family court judgeshipa in East Baton Rouge Parish ran for a designated
post &thin the district. There was a district residency requirement for the
aforementioned judicial offices. With respect to the multimember court of appeals
districts, there was an additional requirement that the candidate be a resident of the
circuit and the respective district. Id. a t 288. Primaries were conducted on a non-partisan
basis. The two top candidates in the primary would compete a t the general election with
a majority vote requirement. Id. a t 290.
72.
In reaching ita conclusion, the district court followed the Fifth Circuit's panel
decision in Chisom v. Edwards, 839 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1988). that held that judicial
elections were subject to the requirements of section 2.
73.
See supra note 56 and accompanying text for discussion of the Senate Report's
typical factors.
74.
725 F. Supp. a t 295. The court took judicial notice of prior decisions finding
the existence of & jure and de facto discrimination regarding blacks and the right of
suffrage. See Chisom v. Edwards, 690 F. Supp. 1524 (E.D. La. 1988); Major v. Treen, 574
F. Supp. 325,339-41 (E.D. La.1983).
75.
See Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 636 F. Supp. 1113 (E.D. La.
19861, affd, 834 F. 2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987); Major v. Treen, 574 F. Supp. 325 (E.D. La.
1983); East Jefferson Coalition for Leadership and Development v. Parish of Jefferson,
691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La.1988).
76.
Dr. Richard Engetrom, who testified for the plaintiffs, found widespread racial
polarization in voting in Louisiana. The defendants' expert. Dr. Ronald E. Weber,
reached the same conclusion. Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. a t 296.
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substantial socio-economic disparities between African-Americans and
whites in Louisiana, which were viewed by the court as vestiges of past
discrimination that hindered the ability of African-Americans to
participate effectively in the political process.77The court also found
that racial appeals had been utilized in election campaigns involving
candidates of different races.78 The court also noted the paucity of
African-American representation in the challenged judicial offices?9
The court did not find that the size of the districts was a hindrance to
African-American participation. Additionally, the district court decided
that the requirement that candidates run for specific posts limited the
ability of African-Americans to elect candidates of their c h o i ~ e . ~
After reviewing the Senate Report factors, the district court
analyzed the facts in light of the Gingles threshold test. The court
interpreted Gingles as holding that multimember districts did not
violate section 2 unless a politically cohesive minority group was
~ ~ c i e n t numerous
ly
to constitute a majority in a single-member
district and white racial bloc voting prevented the election of minority
preferred candidates?' The court found that African-Americans were
sufficiently numerous and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in single-member subdistricts in twenty-four district court
multimember districts, and the family court district of East Baton
~ court also found that single-member majority
Rouge P a r i ~ h . ' The
African-American districts could be established in each of the existing
circuit courts of appeals district^.'^ In all of these districts, white
majorities had voted to defeat minority preferred candidates." In
light of its findings, the court concluded that the use of multimember
election districts and circuit-wide election districts in judicial elections
afforded African-Americans less opportunity to elect candidates of their
choice.85
After the decisions in Chisom and Houston Lawyers'

77.
Id. at 299.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 301.
81.
Id.
82.
Id. at 301-02.
Id. at 301.
83.
84.
Id. In a subsequent opinion after conducting a district by district analysis of
the Ginglos factors, the district court revised its findings and concluded that violations

had been established in only nine district court judicial districts, the family court for the
East Baton Rouge judicial district, and one district of the court of appeals. Clark v.
Roemer. 777 F. Supp. 445,469 (M.D.
La. 1990).
85.
Clark v. Edwards, 725 F. Supp. at 302.
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Association, the court reexamined its findings in light of the holding in
the latter case that the state's interest in maintaining a link between
a district judge's jurisdiction and the area of residency of his or her
voters was a relevant factor to be considered under a totality of the
. ~ support of its linkage argument, the
circumstances a n a l ~ s i s In
state presented witnesses who testified to the fact that the state had
a vital interest in linking a judge's jurisdiction and the residency of the
voters that elect that judge. The witnesses also stated that election
from smaller subdistricts would create a perception of "hometown
justice."87 After reviewing the record on the issue of the state's
interest in maintaining linkage, the district court concluded that the
state failed to explain adequately the basis for its contention that such
linkage was of vital interest to the state.88 In light of its conclusion,
the court held that the state's purported interest did not preclude a
finding of a section 2 violation regarding the at-large method of judicial
election.
The Clark decision is a well-reasoned, thoughtful analysis of
the issues involved in determining whether judicial elections violate
the rights of minorities. The district court in several opinions
conducted an intense review of the evidentiary record in light of the
Senate Report factors and the Gingles test. After reviewing all the
evidence, the stipulations of the parties, and prior judicial decisions in
the jurisdiction in vote dilution cases, the court determined that a
violation had been established. Additionally, following the Houston
Lawyer's Association decision the court afforded the parties the
opportunity to demonstrate the existence of a state interest in
maintaining a link between a judge's jurisdiction and the residency of
the voters that elect that judge. The court required the state to carry
its burden by demonstrating that there was a factual basis for such a
linkage. After reviewing the evidence submitted, the court determined
that the state had failed to demonstrate adequately that such a
linkage was required to effectuate a governmental interest and
rearmed its liability finding. Requiring the party seeking to avoid a
liability finding to demonstrate the necessity for the maintenance of a
system that hinders minorities from gaining equal access to judicial
office is a sound approach given the weight and importance of the right

86.
87.
88.

Clark v. Roemer. 777 F. Supp. 471,479 (M.D. La. 1991).
Id. at 479.
Id.

Heinonline - - 24 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 20 1992-1993

1992-931

VOTING RIGHTS ACT

21

to vote without discriminatory impediments in American society.sg
C.

Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) v. Evansw

In SCLC, plaintiffs challenged the at-large election system
utilized in Alabama for electing trial judges as violative of section 2.9'
The district court noted that while Chisom rejected the contention that
judicial elections were not subject to a vote dilution challenge, the
Supreme Court gave the district courts little guidance as to how to
evaluate such a challenge under section 2.92 Despite the difficulties
in negotiating what it believed to be uncharted waters, the district
court evaluated the evidentiary record in light of the Gingles standard.
The district court began its analysis by noting that two of the
three threshold Gingles questions had been answered in the
finnative. All parties agreed that the minority group was sufficiently
numerous and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a
single-member district in all but one of the challenged circuits and in
each of the four challenged district^?^ Additionally, the court found
that plaintiffs had established political c~hesion.'~The court also
found that Alabama had a history of discrimination and
disenfranchisement of minority groups and that there was evidence of
racial appeals in some judicial election contest^?^ The court did not
consider the size of the challenged circuits or the majority vote
requirement as an impediment to political participation by
minoritie~.'~The issue of racially polarized voting patterns was
disputed by the defendants?' The court reviewed the testimony of the
9

89. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (The right of suffrage is
fundamental in a democratic society, and alleged infringements of the right to vote must
be carefully and meticulously scrutinized.); accord Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981);
Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679 (1973); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
90. Civ. Act. No. 88-H-462-N. 1992 WL 51575 (M.D. Ala.)
91. Alabama has a unified judicial system of trial and appellate courts. The circuit
court is the trial court of general jurisdiction. Circuit courts are divided into forty
judicial circuits. Each circuit consists of one or more counties. The number of circuit
court judges in the challenged circuits ranged from twenty-four to two. The district
courts are trial courts of limited jurisdiction. Each county has a t least one district court
judge. Candidates for judicial ofice in multimember circuits or districts compete for
designated posts. Id. a t *I.
92. Id. a t *2.
93. Id. a t *4.
94. Id.
95. Id. a t *4.
96. Id. a t '9.
97. Id.
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parties' experts and found that significant racially polarized voting did
not exist."
In addition to examining the Gingles and Senate Report's
factors, the court also analyzed issues that it believed had particular
relevance to a judicial vote dilution case. The first of these issues was
the number of African-Americans lawyers residing in the challenged
circuits or districts. The court noted that the number of AfricanAmericans serving in judicial positions in Alabama was far less
proportionally than the number of African-Americans in the general
population. The court discounted this fact by noting that there was a
paucity of African-American lawyers qualified to seek judicial positions

Id. a t *5. With respect to the racial polarization issue, plaintiffs' expert, Dr.
98.
Allan Lichtman, analyzed approximately three hundred election contests over a ten year
period in which voters were offered a choice of a n African-American and a white
candidate. In those races, Dr. Lichtman found that African-American voters tended to
vote for African-American candidates and white voters voted for white candidates.
However, the district court discounted this evidence, based on the fact that Dr. Lichtman
examined only interracial election contests. Id. a t *5.
There are two critical reasons for examining interracial contests. First, in
order to demonstrate political cohesion, plaintiffs must establish that African-Americans
vote for African-American candidates when given a choice. Second, in order to establish
that white voters have tended to vote as a bloc to defeat minority preferred candidates.
election contests that clearly present choices between white and African-American
candidates can be examined for evidence of such polarization. In the absence of such
proof, the Gingks factors cannot be established. In ignoring the evidence of interracial
election contests, the district court failed to comprehend the significance of this evidence
in establishing racial polarization.
This view of the relevance of racially polarized voting patterns is confirmed by
Gingles. The Court notes that '[blecause both minority and mqjority voters often select
members of their own race as their preferred candidate, it will trequently be the case
that an African-American candidate is the choice of African-Americans, while a white
candidate is the choice of whites." 478 U.S. a t 68. Thus, the critical issue in
determining racially polarized voting is 'the stutlrs of the candidate as the chosen
representative of a particular mcial group.DId. (emphasis in original). The issue to be
determined is which candidate would be chosen by the minority voters in election
contests where minorities are given an opportunity to vote for a minority candidate. If
that candidate received a majority of the minority vote, it is reasonable to infer that that
candidate was the minority preferred candidate. Similarly, in such a race, if white voters
tended to oppose the election of a minority candidate, the court could infer that white
voters tended to vote as a bloc to defeat a minority preferred candidate. The danger in
relying, as the district court did in SCLC, on contests in which no minority candidate
competes is the absence of a statistical tool to determine whether minorities voted for a
white candidate because he or she was in f a d their choice or because there was no
minority candidate in the election contest.
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in the ~ t a t e In
. ~ the challenged circuits and districts where there
were no African-American judges, there were also few qualified
African-American lawyers residing in those districts and circuits. In
contrast, according to the court's analysis, in those circuits where
African-American judges had been elected, those judges occupied more
than a proportionate share of the judicial offices in comparison with
the number of African-Americans residing in those districts who were
qualified to run for the subject offices.loOIn weighing this evidence,
the court analogized a voting rights case to an employment
discrimination case. The court noted that in employment
discrimination cases involving exclusion from skilled jobs, the district
courts utilize a smaller statistical pool to determine if minorities have
been denied skilled positions, and that a larger statistical pool is used
where a case involves nonskilled jobs.lO' If this approach is employed
in a voting rights case where there were few African-American lawyers
qualified to seek judicial office by election, there could be no claim of
discriminatory exclusion. Utilizing the employment discrimination
analysis, the court concluded, in light of the limited number of
qualified African-American attorneys residing in the challenged
districts, that the state had a compelling state interest in maintaining
a large pool of lawyers from which to make selections for judicial
seats.'02
The court also accepted the state's argument that Alabama had

99. There were 9,600 licensed lawyera in Alabama, and only 295 were AfricanAmerican. Id. a t *7.
100. The tenth judicial circuit had three African-American circuit judges out of
twenty four. It had no African-American district judges out of eleven. According to the
court's analysis, the proportionate number of African-American trialjudges in the tenth
circuit was 8.6%, whereas only 3.48% of the qualified lawyers were African-American in
that circuit. Id. a t *7. The thirteenth circuit had fourteen circuit judges, one of whom
was African-American and only one African-American district judge. The court found
that African-American lawyers held 14.3% of the judicial positions, but constituted only
2.1% of the pool from which judicial ofices are filled. Id. a t *8. Similarly, in the
fifteenth circuit, one of seven circuit judges was African-American and all of the three
district judges were white. The court concluded that African-American attorneys made
up 5% of the qualified attomeys, yet held 10% of the judicial seats. Id
101. Id. a t *8. The court observed that "[wlhen 'special qualifications are required
to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller
p u p of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little probative
value! "Id.(quoting Hazelwood School Districtv. U.S., 433 U.S. 299,307-08 n. 13 (1977).
See also Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974); J.A.
Richmond v. JA Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Peightal v. Metropolitan Dade County,
940 F.2d 1394 (11th Cir. 1991).
102. Civ. Act. No. 88-H462-N. 1992 WL 51575 a t '12.
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a strong interest in linking a judge's jurisdiction to the population that
elects the judge.lo3 The court also gave credence to the view that a
subdistrict remedy would create the perception for a litigant from
outside the judge's election district that a degree of bias exists in favor
of an opponent from the judge's electorate."" In light of the foregoing
and its analysis of the Gingles and Senate Report factors, the court
rejected the plaintiffs' claims.
The most problematic feature of the district court's
determination of the issues in SCLC was the adoption of an
employment discrimination standard. By incorporating a standard
from employment discrimination law, the court completely defeated the
purpose of the Voting Rights Act. The Act is not meant to protect
employment rights of excluded African-American lawyers or
candidates. The purpose of the Act is to guarantee that minority voters
will not be disenfranchised by election systems or practices adopted by
the majority that work to dilute the voting strength of protected class
members. Essentially, the Act seeks to protect the minority from the
effects of discriminatory voting practices. The Act is not an equal
employment opportunity bill, and therefore considerations appropriate
to a case involving exclusion from the workforce have no relevance in
determining whether African-American voters have had an equal
opportunity to participate in the electoral process. In a voting rights
case, the focus is on the rights of the voters, not the rights of the
candidates.
This view of the Act is supported by the Senate Report's
discussion of the meaning of amended section 2. According to the
Report, plaintiffs must prove that the challenged system results in the
denial of access to the political process.105Thus, Section 2 protects
the right of minority voters to be free from election practices,
procedures or methods that deny them the same opportunity to
participate in the electoral process as other citizens enjoy.lW In the
twenty-three cases that were examined in the Senate Report, the issue
in each case was whether the members of the minority group had the
same opportunity as others in the electorate to participate and elect
representatives of their choice.lo7 At no point in the legislative

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. at *lo.
Id.
S.Rep., suprn note 17, at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 32.
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history was there any suggestion that the number of potential
candidates residing in a challenged district was a relevant issue in
resolving a vote dilution claim.
It is also disingenuous to rely on the paucity of qualified
candidates residing in the challenged districts as a determining factor
in a vote dilution case given the mobility of American citizens. It may
well be the case that few potential African-American candidates reside
in a challenged district because of the existence of an at-large election
system that dilutes the voting strength of a politically and
geographically cohesive minority group. Additionally, if a court finds
in favor of a voting rights plaintiff and creates a subdistricting remedy,
such a remedial provision may encourage the migration of minority
candidates to that district who might otherwise not have resided there
because of the lack of success of other candidates under the at-large
system. Because of these reasons, it is inappropriate to utilize the
proportion or number of potential candidates residing in a district a s
a controlling factor in a vote dilution case.
The court also incorrectly used the paucity of prospective
minority candidates residing in the challenged areas as support for the
state's interest in preserving a qualified judiciary. By accepting this
premise as a legitimate state concern and terminating the inquiry a t
the liability phase, the court denied plaintiffs the opportunity to
demonstrate that there were other, less discriminatory means to
accomplish the state's purpose. Rather, the court should have afforded
plaintiffs an opportunity to demonstrate the existence of alternatives
to the at-large election system that could be employed to both remedy
the vote dilution of minority group members and protect the state's
interest in a qualified judiciary. One possible remedy would be to
replace the at-large system with subdistricts and eliminate the
requirement that a candidate reside within the geographical
s u b d i s t r i ~ t . ' This
~ ~ approach furthers the rights protected under
108. This approach was used in Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183 (S.D. Miss.
1987),a pre-Chisom decision, where the court noted a t the liability phase that in some
of the challenged counties there were few statutorily qualified African-American lawyers
in residence. Id. a t 1184. African-Americans constituted 35% of the population of
Mississippi and 3.7% of the lawyers. Of 5,900lawyers admitted in Mississippi, only 220
were African-American. Only 150 of the African-American lawyers had the statutory
qualifications for the subject judicial offices. Id. a t 1193. Despite the paucity of qualified
African-American lawyers, the court viewed this only as a factor in determining the vote
dilution claim, not as a controlling factor, as the court did in SCLC. Id. a t 1193 At the
remedial phase, the court decided to create subdistricts for the challengedjudicial ofices
and eliminated any subdistrict residency requirement. The court stated that the ruling
was necessitated by the lack of statutorily qualified African-American candidates for
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section 2 without impermissibly intruding on a state's right to
establish legitimate qualification standards.
The Supreme Court in Chisom established that judicial
elections are subject to the dictates of section 2. However, the issue of
liability determination was not addressed by the Court. This issue
should be determined in the judicial context as in other vote dilution
challenges to at-large election systems. Specifically, courts should
review the facts in light of the standards enunciated in Gingles and
the Senate Report factors. This approach is a functional one which
permits an appraisal of the facts of each case and affords all parties
the opportunity to present evidence that will assist the court in
determining liability. Additionally, the state's interest in the
maintenance of an at-large system should be treated as one factor
among many that the court should consider in reaching its liability
determination. However, if the court concludes that the state's interest
is a compelling one, plaintiffs should have the opportunity at the
remedial stage to offer alternatives to the at-large system that will
remedy the dilution of minority voting strength and accommodate the
state's interest.

judicial office residing in some of the subdistricts. The court, in eliminating the
residency requirement, balanced the state's interest in having qualified candidates
against the right of minorities to have equal access to the political process. Martin v.
Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327,332-33 (S.D. Miss. 1988) (At the remedial stage, Governor Ray
Mabus was substituted for former Governor William A. Allain.) Id. a t 327. The court
concluded that the state's interests could be protected by an alternative system that did
not impede the ability of minorities to elect judicial candidates of their choice. By
employing a balancing approach, the court was able to accommodate the state's interest
in maintaining a qualified judiciary and protect the minority group's voting rights.
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In successful vote dilution challenges to at-large election
systems, the courts have traditionally utilized the subdistricting
remedy to alleviate the section 2 violation^.'^^ In creating a
subdistricting remedy, the courts carefully scrutinized proposed plans
to ensure that minorities have an equal opportunity to elect candidates
Courts have also taken into account traditional
of their ch~ice."~
redistricting criteria in the creation of subdistrict plans."' Two
district courts have considered the issue of fashioning remedies where
a violation of section 2 exists in a state's at-large judicial election
In both cases, the courts considered numerous alternatives to
the at-large multimember judicial election system. After evidentiary
hearings and consideration of the applicable law, both the Martin and
Clark courts decided that single-member districts were the most
appropriate means to remedy the proven violations.

109. See, e.g., Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); East Carroll Parish School
Board v. Marshall, 424 U.S. 636 (1976) (per curium); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1
(1975); Mahan v. Howell. 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971)
(per curium). See also Pamela Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 Harv. C.R.4.L. Rev. 173 (1989);
Danial Oritz, Note, Alternative Voting Systems as Remedies for Unlawfil At-Large
Systems, 92 Yale L.J. 144 (1982).
110. The preferred method to ensure that result is the creation of 'safe" districts
where racial minorities have an effective electoral majority. Because the proportion of
minorities who are of voting age tends to be less than that of other groups and minorities
have lower registration and turnout rates, the courts have created supermajority
districts. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144,164 (1977) ("[Slubstantial
nonwhite population majority - in the vicinity of 65% - would be required to achieve a
nonwhite majority of eligible voters."); Kethcum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398 (7th Cir. 1984).
111. Typical criteria include compactness, contiguousness, and population equality.
See, e.g., Wyche v. Madison Parish Police Jury, 635 F.2d 1151 (5th Cir. 1981); Marshall
v. Edwards, 582 F.2d 927 (5th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 442 U.S. 909 (1979). For an
application of these criteria to the creation ofjudicial subdistricts see infra notes 120,121
and 150 and accompanying text.
112. Martin v. Mabus. 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.Miss. 1988);Clark v. Roemer, 777 F.
Supp. 445 (M.D. La. 1990) (pre-Chisom) and 777 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991) (postChisom).
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Martin v. Mabus

In Martin, the plaintiffs challenged the at-large election of
circuit, chancery and certain county court judges in the state of
Mississippi as violative of section 2. After a trial on the issue of
liability, the district court found section 2 violations in eight of the
challenged district^."^ At the remedy phase, the court decided that
the creation of single-member subdistricts for election purposes was
the most effective remedy for the section 2 violation^."^ Judges were
to be elected from subdistricts but their jurisdiction would not be
linked with their electorate. Thus, judges elected on a subdistrict basis
The court also ruled
could serve in their entire judicial di~trict."~
that there would be a judicial district residency requirement, but
judicial candidates would not be required to reside within their election
subdistrict. The court refused to require election district residency
because of the low number or absence of qualified candidates in some
subdistri~ts."~
By not requiring residency within the subdistrict, the
court balanced the minority group's rights against the state's interest
and sought to accommodate both by requiring that judicial candidates
reside within the jurisdictional district but not the smaller election
subdistrict.
In the remedial phase, the court noted that where a section 2

113. Martin v. Allain, 658 F. Supp. 1183. 1204 (S.D.Miss. 1987). The court found
violations in the fifth, seventh, ninth and eleventh chancery court districts, the fourth,
seventh, eleventh circuit court districts, and the Hinds county court district. The
chancery court is an equity and probate trial court of unlimited jurisdiction. The circuit
courts are the law trial courts of unlimited jurisdiction. Id. a t 1187. The state was
divided into twenty chancery and twenty circuit court districts. All districts were drawn
according to county lines. With the exception of two single-countychancery districts, the
chancery districts contained from two to six counties. There were thirty-nine chancery
judges, six of whom were elected from single judge districts. Of the twenty circuit court
districts, only one was a single-county district. The other nineteen districts contained
two to seven counties. There were forty circuit judges, six of whom were elected from
single-county districts. In all chancery and circuit court multi-judge districts, judges
were elected district-wide and to numbered posts. Each judge must be a resident of his
or her district. Id.
114. 700 F. Supp. a t 332.
115. ' Id.
116. Judicial candidates in Mississippi are required to be over thirty years of age
and practicing attorneys for five years, thereby reducing the number of potentially
eligible candidates. Id. a t 332-33. See supm note 108 for a complete discussion of the
court's rationale for not requiring subdistrict residency.
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violation has been found, the court must fashion a remedy that is both
commensurate with the violation found and completely remedies the
dilution of minority voting strength. While the court recognized that
it was not bound by the doctrine of one-person, one-vote in the creation
it acknowledged that general equitable principles
of s~bdistricts,"~
required that population variance be minimized between subdistri~ts."~
In an effort to devise an appropriate remedy, the court,
pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a), appointed an expert to
draft proposed subdi~tricts."~Although the court believed that
creatingjudicial subdistricts presented different issues than traditional
legislative redistricting, the court instructed its expert to use certain
general redistricting criteria.l2' The court directed its expert to use
these criteria in descending order.l2l
At the hearing on the expert's plan, the plaintiffs challenged
the numerical percentage of the African-American majority in certain

117. See Wells v. Edwards, 347 F. Supp. 453,454-55 (M.D.La. 1972) (three-judge
court), a f f d mern., 409 U.S. 1095 (1973); Voter Information Project, Inc. v. City of Baton
Rouge, 612 F.2d 208,211 (5th Cir. 1980).
118. 700 F. Supp. a t 333.
119. Id. a t 331.
120. The traditional criteria include compactness, contiguity, community of
interest, natural boundaries, and preservation of existing precinct lines. 700 F. Supp. at
332. The court believed that the community of interest criteria should be applied
differently in the judicial redistricting context. The court stated that "[slevere ethical
restrictions are placed on an attorney's capabilities in campaigningfor judicial office, and
. . . lawyers are better known by their association with their home communities and
home counties rather than with the district as a whole." Id. a t 332.
121. The criteria framed by the court were as follows:
(1) In each district there should be a t least one judicial sub-district
with a black majority population of 60%. . . .
(2) The single member sub-districts must be contiguous and should
be as compact as possible. . . .
(3) In multi-county districts, whole counties should be preserved
where possible. . . .
(4) Where possible, cities or towns, with the exception of Jackson,
Mississippi, should not be divided among separate sub-districts. . .
(5) Where counties have to be divided, the sub-districts should be
drawn along current precinct lines. . . .
(6) Precincts should not be divided among separate judicial subdistricts. . . .
(7) If a county or city has to be divided, wherever possible common
lines should be used for both circuit and chancery court sub-district
boundary lines. . . .
(8) A 15% maximum range of deviation is allowable for population
variance among sub-districts within a judicial district.
700 F. Supp. a t 333-35.
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s u b d i s t r i ~ t s . ' The
~
plaintiffs had proposed that these subdistricts
have a 68.5% majority because of lower voter registration rates among
The court rejected the plaintiffs
African-Americans in Mis~issippi.'~~
approach and adopted a 60% numerical majority for minority
subdistricts. The court believed that the higher figure was unnecessary
to ensure minority success at the polls because of recent electoral
victories in predominantly minority districts with less than a 65%
majority.'" The court also rejected the 68.5% majority because it
feared that such a requirement would overconcentrate minorities into
districts and lessen their ability to influence judicial races in adjacent
s~bdistricts.'~~
In addition to critiquing the court's criteria and the plan
proposed by its expert, the plaintiffs proposed an alternative to the
subdistricting remedy. One alternative was a limited voting procedure.
Under that proposal, at-large multimember districts would be retained
and voters would be allocated fewer votes than the judgeships to be
~ court rejected this alternative as
filled a t an e l e c t i ~ n . ' ~The
experimental and unnecessary in the context of the pending litigation.

122. Id. a t 335.
123.
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Allan Lichtman, conducted a study that suggested that
54% of the African-American voting age population was registered and 79% of the white
voting age population was registered. 700 F. Supp. a t 335. A guideline of 65% of the

total p o d a t i o n has been approved by the Supreme Court as representing the proportion
of minority population required to ensure minorities a fair opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice. See, e.g., United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 164
(1977) (White, J.) ('[Slubstantial nonwhite population majority - in the vicinity of 65% would be required to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible voters.").
124.
The court noted that in the second congressional district with an AfricanAmerican majority of between 58-605, an African-American candidate, Mike Espy, was
successful in a 1986 race. 700 F. Supp. a t 333. The second congressional district covered
the same geographical area as the proposed majority African-American judicial
subdistrict. Id.
125.
Id. a t 333-34.
126.
Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Richard Engstrom, described two different variants of
the limited voting procedure. Under a single, non-transferable limited voting system,
in judicial districts with two or three judgeships, voters would be able to cast a vote for
only one judge a t each election. Under a double, non-transferable system, in judicial
districts with four judgeships, voters could cast ballots for two judges a t each election.
According to Dr. Engstrom, this system remedies minority vote dilution by eliminating
the submergence of a cohesive minority group. 700 F. Supp. a t 337. This system also
eliminates the winner-take-all feature of the at-large system and may be useful in cases
where minorities are not geographically compact. See Karlan, s u p m note 109. The court
noted that limited voting systems had been adopted in consent decrees in section 2 cases
in Alabama and North Carolina. 700 F. Supp. a t 337.
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It found that subdistricts were an adequate remedy.12' After
reviewing its expert's redistricting plan and the critique of that plan
by plaintiffs' experts, the court ordered the creation of sub-districts.
While questions may remain regarding the court's use of a 60%
majority and the criteria it developed to guide its expert, the court did
engage in a local appraisal of the factors it believed pertinent to the
creation of a workable remedy. In terms of the numerical prerequisite,
the court did not accept an ironclad requirement of a 65% majority. In
so doing, the court correctly examined the voting behavior, turnout,
and registration rates of the minorities living in the subject districts.
After making an analysis of the opportunity for electoral success in the
districts involved in the litigation, the court developed a 60% threshold
requirement. This approach is a sound one. Rather than utilize a 65%
yardstick in all cases, courts seeking a remedy for a section 2 violation
should study minority electoral success in the jurisdiction in order to
determine the appropriate numerical majority in minority subdistricts.
Without evidence of voter behavior, a court that creates supermajority
minority districts may be overconcentrating minorities or packing them
into a district and lessening their ability to achieve a majority in one
district and influence elections in an adjacent district where they
constitute a sizable percentage of the population.
The court also correctly declined to accept plaintiffs' limited
voting alternative to the at-large election system. Having found that
minority group members were sufYiciently large and geographically
compact to constitute a majority in a single member district, the court
properly concluded that such an approach was unnecessary. However,
that option may be viable in cases where the defendants are able to
prevail on a claim that the state has a compelling state interest in
maintaining an at-large judicial election system. In cases where the
state has demonstrated a legitimate interest in maintaining an atlarge election system, the limited voting method could be utilized to
protect the state's interest and provide a remedy for a violation of
section 2.The advantage of a limited voting system is that it prevents
a numerical majority from bloc voting to fill all the judicial offices. By
limiting the votes of both the majority and the minority group, the
latter has an opportunity to elect a portion of the office holders, and
the winner-take-all feature of the at-large election system is thereby
eliminated. The possible disadvantage of this approach is that it
requires a sophisticated electorate. Minority voters must understand
that they have to aggregate their votes behind a minority candidate in
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order to achieve electoral success. Since, in most instances, local
judicial contests are not highly visible contests, the limited voting
option may not be a realistic choice to remedy section 2 violations.
Additionally, in Martin, the court employed the appropriate
approach with respect to the issue of the low number of potential
candidates residing in subdistricts. Unlike the court in SCLC, the
Martin court did not view the paucity of potential candidates as a
controlling factor. Despite the concern over this issue, the court
realized that there was another method to ensure a n adequate number
of qualified candidates and afford minority group members an equal
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice. Rather than enshrine
the at-large election system as the sole means of preserving the state's
interest, the court ruled that judicial candidates did not have to reside
within their election subdistrict and provided that judges elected from
smaller geographical units would have jurisdiction in the entire
judicial district. By balancing the state's interest and the minority
group members' right to equal access, the court was able to ensure that
both concerns were addressed in its remedial plan. This approach is
preferable to that of the SCLC court that gave too much weight to the
state's purported interest in maintaining the at-large feature of its
judicial election system and did not adequately consider the other
options available to accommodate the state and protect minority group
members' voting rights.
B.

Clark v. R ~ e n e r ' ~ ~

In CZark, the plaintiffs challenged the at-large election system
utilized in Louisiana to elect trial and intermediate appellate
judges.lZ9At the liability phase, the court determined that the use
of multimember judicial districts in eleven districts violated plaintiffs'
rights under section 2.13" At the remedy stage, the district court
granted the state an opportunity to develop legislation to redress the
violation^.'^' Such legislation was adopted but the voters of

128. 777 F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991).
129. See supm note 71 and accompanying text for a discussion of the factual
contentions raised in Clark.
130. 725 F. Supp. 285 (M.D. La. 1988). See supm note 84 and accompanying text.
131. 777 F. Supp. at 451. In vote dilution cases, the courts traditionally afford the
state or political subdivision a reasonable period of time to develop plans to remedy the
violation. See, e.g., Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37.41-43 (1982); McDaniel v. Sanchez,
452 U.S. 130, 138-39 (1981); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 539-40 (1978). However,
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Louisiana rejected the Legislature's proposed revision^.'^^ After the
legislative initiative was rejected by the voters, the court permitted the
parties to submit proposed remedies for the section 2 violations. After
considering all plans and evidence submitted, the court decided that
a subdistricting remedy would be most efficacious in correcting the
dilution of minority voting strength.''' In the course of two opinions
on the remedial issues, the court analyzed various alternatives
submitted by the parties and commented on the evidence of the state's
interest in the maintenance of the at-large election system.
At the remedy phase, plaintiffs proposed two possible remedies.
One was a traditional subdistricting approach with districts drawn
that would maximize minority voting strength.'" The court
acknowledged that there were problems inherent in the adoption of a
subdistricting remedy. There would be a need to modify the subdistrict
lines due to population shifts or when additional judgeships were
created and traditional redistricting criteria would have to be employed
in the creation of the subdistrict lines. Additionally, the court stated
that there may be a perception that a judge elected from a small
geographical unit would be prone to rule favorably for his or her
constituents, thereby creating the impression of "hometown
justice."'35 Despite these concerns, the court ultimately concluded
that the subdistricting approach was superior to other alternatives
because it was the only remedy that had a substantial likelihood of
alleviating the section 2 violations.
Another alternative proposed by the plaintiffs was the limited
Under this proposal, multimember districts would
voting 0pti0n.l~~
be retained in all judicial districts, and the number of votes cast by
each elector would be limited to less than the number of positions to
be filled. The benefit is that a minority group can overcome the effects
of vote dilution by submergence in a predominantly white voting bloc
by aggregating its votes behind a particular candidate. The court
perceived numerous difficulties with this proposal. First, it would
require the elimination of Louisiana's majority vote requirement, thus
requiring all candidates to run in a pool. Elections would be required

the defendant's plan is subject to court review under a section 2 analysis. See Dillard v.
Crenshaw County, 831 F.2d 246, 250-52 (11th Cir. 1987).
132. 777 F. Supp. at 451.
133. Id. at 468; See 777 F. Supp. 471 (reconsideration of remedy phase postChisom).
134. 777 F. Supp. at 467.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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at the end of every judicial term since all candidates would qualify for
the same office and the top vote getters would fill the available office. .
Finally, the court stated its reluctance, in a case seeking greater access
to the ballot, to limit the number of votes electors would have to cast
for candidates of their choi~e.'~'For these reasons the court rejected
the limited vote option. This option was not seen by the court as viable
in light of the state's policy of election by majority vote.138
A proposal to replace the popular election of judges with a
political appointment system was suggested by the Louisiana
Organization for Judicial Excellence (LOJE).13' LOJE contended that
the appointment system would improve the quality of the judiciary and
eliminate the possibility of further vote dilution. The court, however,
took a limited view of its responsibilities a t the remedy stage. It
believed that in fashioning a remedy for voting rights violations, a
court should not intrude unnecessarily on policies expressed in the
state's statutory or constitutional provision^.'^" The court stated that
its equitable powers were limited to correcting the violation found, not
replacing the system that the state had devised for the selection of its
judges.141 In this regard, the district court found that the state of
Louisiana had expressed a strong preference for popular election of
judges by a majority vote.la2 Accordingly, the court believed it was
precluded from eliminating that policy in favor of gubernatorial
appointment and a retention e1ecti0n.l~~
Another remedy for the at-large election system was proposed
by the Louisiana District Judges Association and the governor. They
suggested that the majority vote requirement be replaced by a

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id. at 468.
Id.
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id. The court stated that:

[Tlhe federal court is not free to impose its own notion of whether a
better system than that employed by the state could be devised.
Federal authority becomes involved only because of a federal
violation and, while the court has broad equitable authority to
remedy the federal violation, that authority ends when the remedy
is devised.
777 F. Supp. at 467. See also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795 (1973); Martin v.
Mabus. 700 F. Supp. 327, 330 (S.D. Miss. 1988).
142. 777 F. Supp. at 466.
143. Id. at 466-467.
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plurality voting standard.lU The court acknowledged that this
approach had a certain appeal in its simplicity. There would be no
necessity for drawing or redrawing subdistrict lines, and it would
retain Louisiana's strong preference for popular election of judges.lJ5
The plurality vote solution was rejected by the court because there was
insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the elimination of the
majority vote requirement, without creating subdistricts, would
actually remedy the violation.lMAdditionally, in order for a plurality
system to provide minorities with an equal opportunity to elect
candidates of their choice, there would have to be more than two
candidates and in Louisiana the overwhelming number of judicial
elections involved only two candidates. Thus, in the court's opinion, the
plurality plan did not address adequately the violation of plaintiffs'
voting rights.14'
In light of the numerous difficulties perceived in the
alternatives to subdistricts, the court concluded that subdistricting was
the only solution that would actually alleviate the section 2 violation.
The court ordered that a subdistrict plan be devised with election
subdistricts to be drawn in the eleven judicial districts where
violations had been found a t the liability stage." Under the court's
remedial order, a prospective candidate would be required to be a
resident of the judicial district but not of his or her election
subdi~trict.'~~
Additionally, the court found that the redistricting
criteria relied on by defendants' expert in the creation of subdistricts
were appropriate.lm In reviewing both the plaintiffs' and defendants'

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468.
Id.
Those factors were:
(1) All subdistricts must be compact;
(2) All subdistricts must be contiguous;
(3) Parish and municipal boundaries should be maintained;
(4) Current parish precinct lines should be followed;
(5) Each subdistrict must be drawn using the existing number of
judgeships;
(6) Deviation in population must be kept to a minimum;
(7) Gerrymandering to dilute minority voting strength must be
avoided;
(8) Tacking" or gerrymandering to concentrate minority voting
strength in an attempt to achieve proportional representation must
be avoided.
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plans, the court found that neither completely addressed the
redistricting criteria and ordered the parties to submit new plans or
stipulate as to the configuration of the districts.lsl
Before the court could review proposals from the parties for the
implementation of the subdistrict remedy, the Supreme Court decided
Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Association. In light of the Court's
holding that a state's interest in the preservation of its at-large judicial
election system was a legitimate factor to be considered by a district
court in assessing a section 2 vote dilution case, the Clark court
provided the defendants the opportunity to submit additional evidence
regarding the state's interest. Numerous defense witnesses testified
that a subdistricting remedy would produce perceptions of "hometown"
justice, subject judges to special interest group pressures, that the
appointment system would produce a more qualified judiciary than
election by subdistrict, and that election districts should be linked with
the jurisdictional parameters of a judge.ls2 Plaintiffs called an
African-American circuit judge from Mississippi, Robert Gibbs, who
had been elected in 1990 under the remedial plan developed in
Martin.153Judge Gibbs testified that he was not subject to local
pressure from his subdistrict electorate, and, in most cases he did not
know whether a party resided within or without his election district.
He further stated that the perception of minorities concerning the
judicial system had improved since his election to the bench.'" In
comparison to the improved perception of Mississippi black citizens of
the judicial system, three of the plaintiffs in Clark testified that the
general perception of the judicial system in the Louisiana minority
community was one of apprehension and mistrust.
After reviewing the evidence, the court concluded that although
numerous witnesses testified about the fear of hometown justice and
the need to link a judge's jurisdiction with his or her electorate, these
concerns were not sufficiently vital so as to preclude a finding of
section 2 violations. The court accordingly reaffirmed its earlier
liability finding^.'^^ On the basis of the record, the court also ruled
that the interests advanced by the state were not sdXcient to preclude

777 F. Supp. at 468.
151. Id.
152.
777 F. Supp at 475-77.
153. Id. at 477. See supm note 113 and accompanying text.
154.
777 F. Supp at 477.
155. Id. at 479.
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the adoption of a subdistricting remedy.'= With respect to the
appropriate remedy, the court concluded that the alternatives to
subdistricting would require a greater intrusion into state policies than
was appropriate to remedy the deprivation of plaintiffs' voting rights.
In accordance with its rulings on liability and the appropriate remedy,
the court concluded by approving various proposals for the creation of
subdistri~ts.'~~
The court in Clark was faced with the daunting prospect of
remedying a finding of vote dilution in a judicial election case without
any guidance from the Supreme Court or the circuit court. Guided by
the principle that the remedy must be tailored to fit the violation, the
court refused to engage in a wholesale replacement of the election
system with an appointive system. While the court believed it was
restrained under traditional equitable principles from engaging in a
complete restructuring of the method of selecting state court judges,
there are other sound reasons of policy for a court's refusal to
dismantle a judicial election system in order to remedy a vote dilution
determination. When minority voters seek federal intervention to
remedy a deprivation of their rights, they are seeking to improve their
access to the elective system. They are calling upon the federal
judiciary to step in and, if a violation is found, to aid in the creation of
an election system that will equalize the rights of the minority with
those of the majority. It would be anomalous if after finding a vote
dilution violation, the federal court, instead of improving minority
access to the electoral system, orders that minority group members can
no longer vote for the subject office. That result would send a terrible
message to future voting rights and civil rights plaintiffs. While there
are arguments advanced that the appointment system would enable
more African-Americans to become judges, the best guarantee of that
reality is to afford minority group members the opportunity to elect the
judges who will sit in judgment of them. It is for this reason that the
subdistricting remedy is the most appropriate remedy for section 2
violations. It is the remedy that best insures that the members of the
protected classes will have the opportunity to vote and elect
representatives of their choice.
Additionally, the Clark court properly rejected the state's
contentions that its interests were so compelling that a violation could
not be established or, alternatively, that a subdistricting remedy was

156.
157.

Id.
Id. at 481-83.
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inappropriate. The Clark court refused to accept a t face value the
assertions of the state's witnesses. In order to overcome the liability
finding, the court required the state to come forward with credible
evidence demonstrating that the at-large scheme was essential to the
advancement of a legitimate state interest. Also, the court, in
considering various alternatives, gave all parties the opportunity to
advance alternative methods for protecting the state's alleged interests
and remedying the violations. In the end, the court concluded that the
least intrusive and most efficacious method of achieving both ends was
to create subdistricts with African-American majorities. This was a
legitimate response in light of the fact that the African-American
population was geographically compact. In other situations, where
there is a lack of geographical cohesion or the state demonstrates a
compelling governmental interest for maintaining an at-large system,
the limited voting option or other alternatives should be explored.
However, in those cases where geographical cohesion is established,
the subdistricting remedy represents the optimal choice to ensure the
protection of the rights of minority group members to equal access to
the political process.

The United State Supreme Court surprised its liberal critics by
ruling in Chisom that state court judges were subject to the
requirements of section 2 when those judges achieved office by popular
election. While this decision represents a tremendous opportunity for
minority voters, it could still be a hollow victory if the courts narrowly
interpret the ruling. In Houston Lawyers' Association, the Court
afforded the states an opportunity to undercut the holding in Chisom.
By d i n g that a state's interest in the preservation of its system of
electing judges on an at-large basis was a legitimate factor to be
considered in a vote dilution case, the Court gave the states and
federal judges, who may be inclined to disagree with the broad holding
in Chisom, the opportunity to undercut the promise of Chisom.
The concern is that the federal courts will permit a state to
advance arguments that it has a strong interest in the preservation of
its system as a counterpoint to a prima facie case of vote dilution.
Some courts may give greater weight to the state's contentions and
rule against minority voters a t the liability stage. This was the
approach of the SCLC court that held that plaintiffs had not
established a section 2 violation, in large part, due to the court's
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acceptance of the governmental interest argument of the state.'*
This method of resolving the liability determination places too great an
emphasis on the state's interest and undervalues proof of the Gingles
criteria and Senate Report factor^.'^' A superior approach was that
taken by the Clark court that refused to accept speculative arguments
regarding the state's interest and required credible evidence
demonstrating the existence of this factor.lsOAdditionally, the Clark
court permitted plaintiffs to adduce evidence suggesting that there
were alternative remedies that would rectify the dilution of minority
voting strength and protect the state's purported interests.'" BY
permitting such proof, the district court provided the plaintiffs with an
opportunity to demonstrate that the state's interest could be
accommodated by alternatives that did not dilute minority voting
strength.
In addition to giving the states a means of limiting the effect
of Chisom, the Court also left the lower courts a t sea with respect to
how to assess a vote dilution case involving judicial at-large elections
and the appropriate remedy where liability is established. The cases
that have addressed these issues have all chosen to follow the dictates
of Gingles and the Senate Report factors.'= Since vote dilution cases
in the legislative context have been resolved by utilizing the threshold
test of Gingles, this method, in conjunction with reliance on the Senate
Report factors, should be relied upon by the courts in determining
liability in the judicial setting.
Finally, the issue of the appropriate remedy for a section 2
violation will have to be resolved in future litigation. Here, as in the
liability phase, the courts appear to be tuning to the traditional
subdistricting approachemployed in legislative vote dilution cases.'63
While the subdistricting remedy is an appropriate means of alleviating
minority vote dilution, the courts should be willing to consider other
alternatives, such as limited voting,. where either a state has
demonstrated a compelling interest in the maintenance of its system
or where a politically cohesive minority group population is not
geographically compact.
The Voting Rights Act is one of the most effective tools that

158. See supm notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
159. See supm notes 56,64-66 and accompanying text.
160. See supm note 88 and accompanying text.
161. See supm notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
162. Martin v. Mabus, 700 F. Supp. 327 (S.D. Miss. 1988); Clark v. Roemer, 777
F. Supp. 471 (M.D. La. 1991);SCLC v. Evans,785 F. Supp. 1469 (M.D. Ala. 1992).
163. See supm notes 120,121,150 and accompanying text.
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minority communities have for improving the representation that they
receive from legislative and executive officials. With the holding in
Chisom and Houston Lawyers' Association, racial and language
minority groups have been given an opportunity to diversify the state
judiciary and to enhance the quality of justice accorded members of
these groups. But these guarantees of diversity and quality will be
empty vessels unless minority groups vigorously seek to have these
decisions enforced.

Heinonline - - 24 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 40 1992-1993

